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The Invocation ofClouds in Plato's Apology
Abstract
When reading the enormous collection of writings on Socrates, one is apt to respond as Strepsiades did to his
son's defense of mother-beating. Every point seems to follow logically from the last, and the finished argument
apparently stands firmly upon the given evidence - yet, like Strepsiades, we have the visceral feeling that
something is seriously amiss. In the same way, modern readers meet with vastly conflicting appraisals of
Socrates and his philosophy, all of which claim to approach the historical truth most closely. Any treatment of
Socrates must address, at least in passing, the hurtles which a lacunose historical record sets before potential
commentators.
Socrates has never been easy to understand. To non-specialists, he is a stereotypical Greek philosopher,
immortalized for his eponymous teaching method. One of the few certainties about his career was his fixation
upon questioning anyone and everyone. What is known today as the Socratic method, however, bears little
resemblance to Socrates' style of debating. Socrates did not trade in questions and answers, as the modern
practitioner of the Socratic method does. He asked questions which he could not answer, he would respond to
his interlocutors with puzzling irony, and most vexing of all, he frequently denied possession of any knowledge
at all. In a way, Socrates should be the last person associated with the now traditional question-answer script.
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    The Invocation of Clouds in Plato’s Apology
Introduction: The Difficulty of Socrates 
 When reading the enormous collection of writings on Socrates, one is apt to 
respond as Strepsiades did to his son’s defense of mother-beating.  Every point seems to 
follow logically from the last, and the finished argument apparently stands firmly upon 
the given evidence— yet, like Strepsiades, we have the visceral feeling that something is 
seriously amiss.  In the same way, modern readers meet with vastly conflicting appraisals 
of Socrates and his philosophy, all of which claim to approach the historical truth most 
closely.  Any treatment of Socrates must address, at least in passing, the hurtles which a 
lacunose historical record sets before potential commentators.
 Socrates has never been easy to understand.  To non-specialists, he is a 
stereotypical Greek philosopher, immortalized for his eponymous teaching method.  One 
of the few certainties about his career was his fixation upon questioning anyone and 
everyone.  What is known today as the Socratic method, however, bears little 
resemblance to Socrates’ style of debating.  Socrates did not trade in questions and 
answers, as the modern practitioner of the Socratic method does.  He asked questions 
which he could not answer, he would respond to his interlocutors with puzzling irony, 
and most vexing of all, he frequently denied possession of any knowledge at all.  In a 
way, Socrates should be the last person associated with the now traditional question-
answer script1 .
 Properly speaking, Socrates’ method was the elenchus, a dialectic exchange which 
reveals an interlocutor’s contradictory beliefs.  The elenchus can prove propositions false, 
but it cannot make positive assertions.  Beyond the elenchus, Socrates’ views on 
metaphysics and morality are more obscure and quite difficult to analyze.  Today, 
Socrates is popularly conceived of as a  symbol of knowledge, investigation, and 
philosophy in general2.  It is not even clear whether Socrates should be termed as a true 
philosopher, as he made no complete philosophical system, and, for that matter, he left no 
writings at all.
 The roll-call of Socrates’ alumni shows just how ambiguous and open-ended his 
teaching must have been.  Plato responded to Socrates’ denial of knowledge and his 
inability to locate the source of virtue through his theory of the forms, which posited the 
existence of absolute entities.  Antisthines interpreted the denial of knowledge as an 
ultimate lack of certainty and as a source of Cynicism.  Aristippus saw the Socratic goal 
of a happy life as an argument towards hedonism.  And, of course, the non-philosophical 
students of Socrates, such as Xenophon, Critias, and Alcibiades, all conducted 
themselves in vastly different manners.  Plato’s dialogs also vouch for the variety of 
reactions to Socrates’ education; for example, Cephalus placidly declines to take part in 
the philosophical discussion in Republic.  Euthyphro rejects philosophy even when 
shown its proof.  And there were people such as Crito, who, though eager to understand 
Socrates, lacked the aptitude to do so.
 Modern scholars still quarrel over what Socrates meant.  Given our evidence, it is 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2008                                                                            
Curtis Roche, College '08 
 
  
hardly clear.  But perhaps the very ambiguity of Socrates is what has made his legacy so 
enduring.   His lessons provided a multifarious foundation from which countless scholars 
could begin their own work.  The death of Socrates has become a watershed moment in 
history, and Western thought has long been dominated by the doctrines which stem from 
his teachings.  The goal of understanding Socrates is not only of interest to classical 
scholars, but anyone concerned with the roots of the modern world.   
 I approach the topic of Socrates not with the aim of adding to the wealth of diverse 
interpretations of his life and philosophy.  Rather, I intend to apply recent theoretical 
findings to a particularly knotty passage in the Socratic tradition, specifically, the 
invocation of the Aristophanes’ Clouds in Plato’s Apology.  The two texts are closely 
interrelated: Clouds is a reading of Socrates, and the Apology provides a reading of 
Clouds.  Although I address a very minor point in the greater field of Socratic 
philosophy, there are, I think, some important distinctions to be made in this particular 
case which illuminate the larger picture of Socratic philosophy. 
 In Plato’s Apology, Socrates alleges that Clouds was slander (diabolh/).  There are 
many reasons to doubt this claim.  Current scholarship tends to argue either that Clouds
indeed was a negative portrayal of Socrates, or that the cultural atmosphere of Old 
Comedy removed the possibility for didactic political messages in drama.  The 
sometimes schismatic nature of criticism on this issue tends to obscure the common-
ground shared by both stances.  In what follows, I will argue that, although one cannot 
overlook the shots Aristophanes takes at Socrates, Clouds was something less than 
slander.  The preponderance of evidence suggests that Aristophanic satire could not be 
ignored, but neither could it be taken without qualifications.
 If Clouds was not in fact slander, Socrates must have been dissimulating by calling 
it such.      The Apology is a text rife with irony, and whose interpretation remains elusive 
in many spots, especially when compared to other Platonic works and external historical 
evidence.  Some of the most striking cruxes are the daimonion, the oracle, and Socrates’ 
moral philosophy.  The invocation of Clouds, however, is a particularly fertile grounds 
for analyzing Socratic irony because it can be examined through the lens of Aristophanic 
studies.  By examining the significance of Aristophanic satire in normal contexts, we can 
determine the relative truthfulness of Socrates’ assertions about Clouds.  The topic of 
Socratic irony has, with considerably varied result, piqued the attention of numerous 
influential philosophers, and is a subject to large to be treated here in full.  Rather, I will 
conclude by proposing that the invocation of the Clouds is part of the thematic irony in 
the Apology.  By clarifying the force and purpose of the invocation, we can come closer 
to understanding how it resonates with other portions of the text.
   I.  The Claim of diabolh/ in the Apology
 In this chapter I address Socrates’ assertion in the Apology that Clouds was slander 
(diabolh/).  Socrates mentions Aristophanes at the beginning of his defense speech, and 
categorizes his play as the first source of ill will against him.  First, he numbers 
Aristophanes among  his long-standing detractors, who were indirectly responsible for his 
trial because of their unfair portrayal of him: 
 
o4 de\ pa/ntwn a0logw/taton, o3ti ou0de\ ta\  o0no//mata oi[on te au0tw=n ei0de/nai kai/ e0pei=n, 
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plh\n ei1 tij kwmw|diopoio\j tugxa/nei w1n: o3soi de\ fqo/nw| kai\ diabolh/| xrw/menoi 
u3ma=j a0ne/peiqon. [18c-d] 
[What is most unreasonable of all is that it is impossible to know and say the names (of 
these accusers), except if one happens to be a certain comedian.  They persuaded you 
using spite and slander.] 
Socrates again mentions Aristophanes when pointing out the parallels between his 
present indictment and the actions of his namesake in Clouds:
Swkra/thj a0dikei= kai\ perierga/zetai, zhtw=n ta\ u9po\ gh=j kai\ ou0ra/nia kai\ to\n 
h3ttw lo/gon krei/ttw poiw=n kai\ a1llouj tau=ta dida/skwn.  toiau/th ti/j e0stin: 
tau=ta ga\r e9wra=te kai\ au0toi\ e0n th=|j A0ristofa/nouj kwmw|di/a, Swkra/th tina\ e0kei= 
perifero/menon, fa/skonta/ te a0erobatei=n kai\ a1llhn pollh\n fluari/an 
fluarou=nta, w[n e0gw\ ou0den\ ou1te me/ga ou1te mikro\n pe/ri e0pai5w.  (19b-c)
[“Socrates commits injustice and is a busybody, investigating the things under the earth 
and in heaven, and making the weaker argument the stronger, and teaches these things to 
others.”  The indictment goes something like that.  You yourselves saw these things in 
Aristophanes’ comedy, in which a certain Socrates is borne aloft, claiming that he walks 
on air and doing a lot of other similar nonsense, of which I understand neither much nor 
little.] 
Socrates’ accusation is at least ostensibly straightforward: he claims that Clouds sullied 
his name and contributed to the public discontent which led to his indictment.  But it is 
necessary to  recognize Socrates’ statement for what it is— an unsubstantiated assertion.
For a philosopher who claimed to know nothing, and who questioned his neighbors’ 
subjective beliefs whenever possible, there is reason to question the validity of such a 
baseless, provocative claim.  Justifiably, numerous commentator have taken Socrates’ 
words with a grain of salt.
 Ancient writings on Socrates’ reaction to Clouds are confused and confusing.
Claudius Aelian’s Varia Historia tells of a fictitious plot in which Anytus and Meletus 
contract Aristophanes to satirize Socrates as a test of his philosophical abstraction and 
indifference to mockery.  Plutarch’s Education of Children and Diogenes Laertius’ Lives
of the Philosophers briefly discuss Socrates’ alleged disregard for Clouds as trifling 
nonsense.  These writers perhaps intentionally ignore the testimony in the Apology, and 
seem more concerned with portraying Socrates as a generic sage than with examining the 
real puzzles of his philosophy.  It is quite possible that these anecdotes were fabricated.
Eunapius’ short reference to Socrates in Lives of the Sophists essentially takes the claim 
of slander in the Apology at face-value.  None of these ancient sources grapples with 
questions of intertextuality or the cultural milieux in which Aristophanes and Plato wrote, 
issues of vital importance to modern scholars.  These accounts all date from late 
antiquity, and their separation from the actual production of Clouds and the trial of 
Socrates only diminishes their credibility3 .
 Modern discussion of the topic can be divided into into two main arguments: (1) 
some critics vindicate Socrates’ claim in the Apology by reading criticisms of Socratic 
philosophy in Clouds; (2) other scholars focus on the cultural atmosphere and literary 
tradition into which Old Comedy fit, and argue that Clouds cannot be considered a 
slanderous attack on Socrates.  It is important to recognize that the versatility of 
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Aristophanes’ art permits many varied readings of his plays, and that in order to appeal to 
a diverse audience, his plays operated on many levels at once.  For this reason, exegesis 
of Aristophanic comedy is a notoriously knotty subject4 .  It is not my purpose here to 
support any particular reading of Clouds, but rather to reconcile the two above 
propositions: it would be obtuse not to admit that Clouds scrutinizes Socrates and invites 
criticism of his philosophy; nevertheless, given the cultural and literary atmosphere of 
Old Comedy, it would be heavy-handed to call Clouds slander.  In the next chapter, I will 
argue that Socrates intentionally misused the word diabolh/ in his reference to Clouds in 
order to make a more rhetorical argument.   
 Before examining the conditions which, I think, absolve Aristophanes of the charge 
of slander, I will outline the main arguments behind position (1).  A popular springboard 
for this line of argument is a refutation of Dover’s claim that Socrates in the Clouds is a 
composite image of contemporary sophists, a caricature of the intellectual type5.  A 
prima facie examination of Socrates in Clouds provides ample evidence for position (1).  
Scholars who favor this view argue that Aristophanes depicts not a type, but an accurate, 
albeit risibly embellished, portrait.  Many features of the Aristophanic Socrates 
distinguish him from the typical sophist: his poverty reflects his refusal to charge students 
tuition6, he prefers dialectic over oratorical displays7 , and he is described as sickly and 
disheveled8 .  Yet these are all superficialities; since he was writing about a public figure 
everyone knew, Aristophanes was obliged to depict Socrates with his familiar 
idiosyncrasies.    But given the conjectural nature of our knowledge of the historical 
Socrates, and especially his intellectual development, it is much more difficult to 
determine whether Aristophanes was mocking Socrates’ actual doctrines, rather than 
merely his pallor.  The intellectual autobiography which Socrates delivers in Phaedo
seems to contradict his statement in the Apology that he knew nothing about natural 
philosophy.
 Although we will probably never know the truth about Socrates’ early career, the 
miscellany of intellectual ideas tossed around in Clouds seems to vindicate Dover’s claim 
that Aristophanes’ Socrates was a composite, as least in regards to his teachings.  It is 
plausible, as Vander Waert argues, that the Clouds offers an authentic portrait of the 
historical Socrates during his pre-Socratic phase, specifically, as a follower of Diogenes 
of Apollonia9.  It is very easy, however, to point out similarities between known pre-
Socratic teachings and the mess of philosophical jokes throughout Clouds10 .  It is likely 
that Aristophanes was throwing together a wide variety philosophical jargon as the raw 
material for his jokes; as, for instance, in the metaphor of the oven-sky: 
yuxw=n sofw=n e0sti\ frontisth/rion. 
e0ntau=q 0e0noikou=s 0a1ndrej oi3 to\n ou0rano\n 
le/gontej a0napei/qousin w9j e1stin pnigeu/j 
ka1stin peri\ h0ma=j ou[toj, h9mei=j d 0 a3nqrakej.  (94-7) 
[There is a Thinkery of wise minds.  There dwell men who argue and persuade that the 
sky is an oven-lid which is above us and that we are the coals.] 
This is a comical mixture of Hippon’s comparison of the firmament to an oven-lid, and 
Heraclitus’s assertion that all matter is fire11.  In reference to this passage, the scholiast 
mentions that Cratinus made a similar pnigeu/j related joke in his play Panoptai, and he 
concludes that Clouds was not written out of hostility (di0 e1xqran)12.  Although it is 
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possible that Socrates studied natural philosophy in his youth, the preponderance of 
assorted intellectual jokes on such diverse topics as metrics and entomological anatomy 
suggests that no single philosopher is being satirized, but rather erudition in general.  
Sommerstein notes the parallels between Socrates’ discourses in Clouds and Diogenes’ 
philosophies, but considers them parody.13   The audience certainly wouldn’t demand an 
accurate representation of esoteric pre-Socratic doctrines.  If there was any negativity 
against Socrates in Clouds, it was not based upon his early study of natural philosophy.
A much more fertile source of evidence for criticism against Socrates in Clouds lies in a 
comparison between the Aristophanic Socrates and the Socrates from the early Platonic 
dialogs.
 Commentators have read numerous critiques of the Socrates’ teaching methods in 
Clouds; specifically, they take issue with the elenchus.  As Nussbaum notes, the 
catastrophic conclusion of the play seems to result from the failure of Socrates’ elenchus 
as an educational system.  After disproving the old system of morality, Socrates fails to 
provide a replacement.  Although his irony is meant to challenge students to think for 
themselves, it is just as likely for them to misunderstand him.  The Socratic system of 
education, Nussbaum argues, produces irrational alumni like Pheidippides who use their 
skills to the detriment of society at large14.  Strauss points out a similar criticism inherent 
in Clouds, which he notes is closely related to Nietzsche’s examination of Socrates in The
Birth of Tragedy.  By privileging knowledge over all else, Socrates ignores the concerns 
of the polis and ultimately does it harm by neglect15.  Didactic poetics benefits the city 
more than speculative philosophy: as Aristophanes conveyed in the Frogs, Euripidean, 
and therefore Socratic, drama taught the people how to think, but Aeschylian drama, the 
truly poetic variety, instilled civic virtue.16   Plato himself broke with Socrates’ absolute 
faith in the validity of the elenchus, arguing in Meno that virtue cannot be taught, and in 
Phaedrus and Republic that the soul is, at least in part, irrational and illogical.
 Hegel’s criticism of Socrates reiterates Plato’s conclusions, while placing Socrates 
in a more modern paradigm of philosophy as an unfinished and ongoing project.  In his 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel characterizes Socrates as the first 
philosopher to self-consciously examine his own manner of thought, and to consider 
ideas as absolute entities.  In this respect, Socrates represents a turning-point in Western 
philosophy.  Despite the validity of his findings, however, Socrates never produced a 
categorical system of philosophy; and for that matter, the Socratic method cannot 
properly be considered a complete form of education.  The subjective inwardness on 
which the Socratic method rests, Hegel concludes, is essentially an acceptance of 
emptiness17.  Kierkegaard comes to a similar conclusion about Socrates in his Concept of 
Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates, in which he argues that Socrates’ philosophy 
conceptually separates him from society.  The elenchus, he says, is “infinitely negative”: 
it can only disprove contradictory theories, and can never make substantive contributions 
to any science.  Also, the elenchus depends on a personal sense of superiority: Socrates 
knows more than his interlocutors and his wisdom endows him with a sort of aristocratic 
elitism.  Kierkegaard concludes that a poetic irony in the style of the great poets is 
preferable to Socratic irony18, an argument which strikingly resembles those of 
Nietzsche and Strauss.  Nehamas defends Socrates’ philosophy as valid, while making 
the large qualification that Socrates never really taught anything, but was never obliged to 
do so, since he never claimed that he could.  Rather, students, such as Plato, had to 
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emulate Socrates’ virtue through his example19.   
 There are numerous such ways of reconciling Socrates’ philosophy.  One might 
imagine that the success of these interpretations rests more in the skill of the 
commentator than in any inherent order in the system left by Socrates, though we cannot 
tell precisely how Socrates taught his students.  If we trust Plato, his education was quite 
sparse indeed.  At any rate, the volume of commentary on the subject of Socratic 
education, either positive or negative, admits the possibility for faults in Socrates’ 
system.  On the whole, later critics corroborate the first arguments made by Aristophanes 
in Clouds.
 Thus, the most cogent evidence for argument (1)— that Clouds portrays Socrates in 
a negative manner— is the portrayal of the Socratic elenchus as a potential menace to 
civil life.  Although many of Aristophanes’ plays feature the mockery of prominent 
political and cultural figures, we ultimately cannot discern his political affiliations.  His 
survival of two revolutions and the restoration of democracy suggests, in fact, that he had 
a minor role in politics, if any at all20.  Supporters of argument (2)— that cultural and 
literary atmosphere of Clouds repudiates the charge of slander— generally admit the 
conservative leanings in Aristophanes’ plays, but assert that they cannot be taken 
literally.  Euripides may lose the agon is Frogs, but Aeschylus hardly gets off scot-free.
And the same goes for the Good and Bad Arguments in Clouds.  It is equally possible to 
consider Clouds as an attack on Socrates, or as an hommage, or both.  In the remainder of 
this chapter, I will summarize the general points behind argument (2).   
 There are many reasons not to consider Clouds as a candid political attack.  As is 
shown above, Aristophanes’ criticism of Socrates is conceptual and intellectual— the 
scurrilous and obscene jokes are required by the genre and never really attack the heart of 
Socrates’ philosophy. Clouds is certainly not invective, although its political leanings are 
obvious.  De Ste Croix stress the importance of political commentary in Aristophanic 
satire, and likens Old Comedy to modern political cartoons.  The genre demands humor, 
he argues, but the political message strongly outweighs the comedic elements21.  No one 
questions the political nature of Aristophanic comedy, but the exact valence is very 
elusive.  The friendly discourse between Socrates and Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium
would seem impossible if the two were engaged in a vicious public dispute over 
ideologies.  But even if they were, the theater would not be the appropriate forum for a 
political attack.  When Socrates did acquire political enemies, they took him to court.  
Although the theater involved politics, a play was not equivalent to a political attack. 
 From a legal standpoint, Aristophanes was completely free to satirize whomever he 
wished in the theater.  Sommerstein points out numerous textual examples in which 
comedy proved to be irksome to the insulted, although the practice of ad hominem 
mockery remained licit22.  For example, orators such as Lysias or Aeschines could 
matter-of-factly refer to the comic theater as a forum for abuse and scorn23, while the 
Athenian Constitution and a note in the scholia to Acharnians suggest that satire was 
protected by the law24.  Although there was free speech in Athens, it is clear that the 
objects of mockery sometimes took offense, and that various legal measures could be 
taken either for revenge or as a face-saving mechanism.  A good example of this, and a 
case which is in many way parallel to that of Socrates, is the alleged prosecution of 
Aristophanes by Cleon.
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 An examination of the supposed dispute reveals the difficulties in reconstructing 
the legal atmosphere in the late 5th-century, and the ambiguities in this system which the 
Athenians themselves certainly felt.  Our evidence for the dispute between Aristophanes 
and Cleon is a number of striking asides in Acharnians.  It is twice mentioned that Cleon 
took legal action against Aristophanes for his play of the previous year, Babylonians:
au0to/j t 0 e0mauto\n u9po\ Kle/wnoj a3paqon 
e0pi/stamai dia\ th\n per/usi kwmw|di/an. 
ei0selku/saj ga/r m 0 ei0j to\ bouleuth/rion 
die/balle kai\ yeudh= kateglw/ttize/ mou. (Acharnians, 377-80). 
[I know what I suffered at Cleon’s hands because of last year’s comedy.  He dragged me 
before the Council, slandered me, and gave me a tongue lashing of lies.]  
ou0 ga/r me nu=n ge diabalei= Kle/wn o3ti  
ce/nwn paro/ntwn th\n po/lin kakw=j le/gw. (Acharnians, 503-4) 
[This time, Cleon wont slander me for speaking badly about the city in the presence of 
foreigners.]
Years later, Cleon is again ruthlessly mocked in  Knights and Wasps.  Using the evidence 
from Acharnians and the scholia, Sommerstein reconstructs a possible scenario in which 
Cleon used various legal maneuvers to save face after being mocked in the theater25.  Of 
course, this argument rests firmly on textual evidence, but as Rosen argues, there is no 
concrete evidence that any legal action actually took place26. Without entering into a 
detailed and tangential discussion of the case of Cleon, I find it illustrative to point out 
the essential parallels between his representation in Aristophanic comedy in comparison 
to Socrates’.  And although the legal background is largely obscure, the cultural and 
literary atmosphere of Old Comedy makes it much more clear how Aristophanes’ 
comedies functioned in their original setting. 
 Our understanding of the significance of the Greater Dionysia in the Athenian 
consciousness has profited greatly from 20th-century advances in anthropology and 
literary theory27.  These new approaches hardly remove difficulties of exegesis, and in 
some respects problematize the issues further.  Nevertheless, in the case of Aristophanic 
comedy, it is profitable to supplement the analytical tools of traditional philology with 
broader, extra-textual, cultural data.  As Platter argues in his application of Bakhtinian 
theory, Aristophanic satire occurred in a carnivalesque setting, circumscribed by 
quotidian discourse28.  The tendency for Old Comedy to attack public figures (o0nomasti\ 
kwmw|dei=n) fits within the framework of the carnival matrix, a temporary triumph of folk 
culture over official values.  The carnival serves as a momentary release from the normal 
constraints of a hierarchical society, and celebrates the value of life over death by 
reveling in scatological and sexual taboos.  The mockery of public figures fulfills the 
requirements of the carnival and doesn’t necessarily carry a didactic message.  
Halliwell’s discussion of Aristophanic satire largely supports this line of argument.  The 
forerunner of Old Comedy was the kw=moj, a drunken procession endowed with 
carnivalesque license.  Although Old Comedy had advanced to a more regular format, it 
remained squarely within a festival setting dedicated to Dionysus29.  The placement of 
Aristophanic satire within the Dionysia allowed it to be critical without being malicious.   
 Even more ambiguities arise from the artistic nature of Old Comedy.  As Socrates 
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noted in the Apology, the character in Clouds is only  “some Socrates” (Swkra/th tina\).
Despite the obvious resemblance between the real man and the character, it is never clear 
whether the play should be considered honest and serious or fictitious and frivolous.
Modern critics argue that successful art can only be didactic in the sense that it prompts 
the audience to contemplate the subject-matter and come to conclusions of their own.  
Gomme’s discussion of politics in Aristophanes shows that even those characters heaped 
with the most ridicule nevertheless deserve sympathy.  Socrates’ school is burnt, 
Euripides is condemned to Hades, and Cleon is mercilessly lampooned, but the audience 
is nevertheless induced to understand their viewpoints and, to some degree, to 
sympathize30 .  Of course Aristophanes had political beliefs, but comedy was not an 
appropriate medium through which to disseminate them.   
 Modern theories of comedy can also illuminate our understanding of Clouds’
significance to its original audience.  Although comedies mock the famous, these topical 
references remain subordinate to the emotional goals of dramatic art. In his cross-cultural 
study of Western comedy, Silk claims that the purpose of comedy is a celebration of the 
spirit of human survival.  A broad view of Western art reveals that tragedy has aims 
similar to those of comedy, though where tragedy elevates the eternal and the spiritual, 
comedy revels in the present and the pleasure of the flesh31 .  According to this 
definition, Clouds is in some ways a problem comedy, since the final condemnation of 
Socrates supersedes the genre’s demand for a happy ending.  The fiery destruction of the 
Thinkery ironically replaces the traditional nuptial torches, and the chaotic ending 
contrasts sharply with the feasts and celebrations which conclude other Aristophanic 
comedies.  This is hardly an invitation to read literal didacticism into the play, however.
The politics in Clouds is more prominent than in other plays, but the literary context 
remains unchanged. 
 At this point, it is clear how ambiguous Socrates’ use of diabolh/ really was, and 
how many different considerations commentators must take into account when appraising 
Socrates’ claim.  My argument that Clouds was negative towards Socrates but not 
libelous must appear weaker than a case which argues strongly in either direction.
Nevertheless, this view seeks to account for the totality of available evidence, which, I 
believe, does not permit an unqualified answer.  Although many scholars have 
investigated the possible negativity of Clouds towards Socrates, none, to my knowledge, 
has posed the question of whether Clouds was diabolh/.  In fact, the technical legal term 
for defamation in 5th century Athens was kathgori/a (the legal charge for defamation 
was di/kh kathgori/aj)32 .   Socrates’ use of the non-official word stresses the 
ambiguity of his assertion.  Had he actually thought he had been slandered, Socrates 
could have taken legal, or extra-legal measures to either get revenge or save face.  But he 
did not; rather, the trial is the first time that Socrates ever takes issue with Clouds.  In the 
following chapter, I will discuss Socrates reasons’ for invoking Clouds at his trial.  His 
motivations had less to do with the actual content of Clouds than with the political 
circumstances in which the trial was conducted.   
2. Diabolh/ as Socratic Irony 
 From the preceding argument in chapter 1, we can understand that Clouds was not 
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slander.  In this chapter, I turn to Socrates’ provocative use of the word diabolh/, which I 
will argue, functions as part of the thematic irony in the Apology.  Using other evidence 
from the Apology and Crito, I will argue that Socrates’ fundamental goal for the trial was 
to make an iron-clad defense of his philosophy; he was willing to sacrifice his life 
towards this end.  Before examining Socrates’ rhetoric in the Apology it is necessary to 
briefly examine the historical background of the trial.  Socrates makes no mention of the 
political currents at the time of his trial, which were at least as damning to his cause as 
anything he could have possibly said in his defense speech.  In fact, Socrates’ oligarchical 
leanings, whether real of alleged, were probably the reason for his execution.
 Of course, we shall never know for sure why Socrates was tried and executed; the 
best construction modern scholars can formulate is one based upon the totality of possible 
causes.  The jury was aware of each argument against Socrates, and since each individual 
juror could have voted for a different reason, it is best to view the indictment, conviction, 
and execution of Socrates as an overdetermined phenomenon, resulting from no single 
cause but a confluence of several.  And neither was the demise of Socrates a single, 
simple event: even during Plato’s Apology we see each of the actors making statements 
and responses, proposing penalties and counter-penalties, arguments and rebuttals.  Every 
move in the chess-game of the trial was a factor which led to Socrates’ execution.  In this 
way, the potential causes for Socrates’ death abound to the point of absurdity.  It is much 
more profitable to view the trial through the lens of intention: as I will argue, Socrates’ 
guiding motivation was to defend his philosophy.   
 The simplest cause for Socrates’ trial (and one reason why his philosophy needed to 
be defended) was the personal enmity against him.  As documented in the Apology,
Socrates began his philosophical career by declaring that the intellectual elite of Athens 
were self-deluding fools, totally lacking in wisdom.33  His three accusers represented the 
combined wrath of the professional classes: Anytus represented the artisans and 
politicians, Meletus the poets, and Lycon the orators.  There were those of the Athenians 
who, unlike Socrates, cared for professional status and greatly resented his 
generalizations about their personal worth and aptitude.  A good example of Socrates’ 
philosophy being misinterpreted as a personal insult is found in Xenophon’s Apology.
Anytus allegedly bore a grudge against Socrates for suggesting that his son should be a 
philosopher rather than a tanner34.  Such advise would be intolerable to a successful 
craftsman, especially concerning a matter such as one’s son’s upbringing.  Socrates’ well-
intentioned advice was not always taken as such.
 In the previous chapter I discussed modern criticism of Socrates, which focuses 
primarily on the alleged inadequacy of his teaching methods.  There were critics of 
Socrates in his own time as well, whose complaints were directed against the antagonistic 
and hubristic nature of his teaching.  Socrates’ notoriously inscrutable daimonion was 
probably received as poorly as his disputatious debating style.  As modern scholars, we 
are inclined to interpret the daimonion as either a flat-out lie or some kind of intellectual 
intuition.  Xenophon presumes that some of the jury believed literally in the daimonion, 
and convicted Socrates out of jealousy35.  Hegel comments upon this passage in 
Xenophon, and interprets the jury’s response as yet another misunderstanding of Socratic 
philosophy.  According to normative Greek religion, divination was possible because the 
observable world was suffused with signs and signals of the gods’ will.  Socrates’ 
intellectualism functioned largely within this paradigm; his wisdom was akin to the truth 
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from oracles and divination.  Since the observed medium was his own mind, however, 
Socrates considered the source of his knowledge to be a personal daimonion36.  But 
Socrates provides no such explanation, and it is perfectly conceivable that some jurors 
disbelieved his claims.  On the topic of the daimonion, Socrates is not very helpful to his 
audience; it is likely that he was consciously dissimulating or trying to antagonizing 
them.  
 I.F. Stone argues that Socrates deliberately sought his own conviction in order to 
subvert the Athenian democracy.  Especially in the middle dialogs of Plato, Socrates 
strongly favors oligarchy over the radical democracy familiar to Athens.  Whether this 
inclination originated with Socrates or Plato is too large a question to address here; but 
assuming that Socrates was opposed to democracy, the outcome of his trial would 
certainly have pleased him.  Athens thenceforth bore the stigma of having executed one 
of its greatest citizens and having ruled against free speech.  Stone argues that Socrates 
might have easily secured and acquittal if he had appealed to the tradition of free speech, 
but he preferred to turn his death into a spectacle celebrating the failure of the democratic 
system37.  This argument depends on Socrates’ staunch disagreement with the Athenian 
democratic system, which, again, is a very elusive topic.  Whether or not Socrates himself 
opposed democracy, many of his students did, and these connections were certainly fresh 
in the jurymen’s minds at the trial. 
 Because of the amnesty, the democrats were powerless to avenge themselves on 
The Thirty, though they were  free to vent their wrath on Socrates.  Although Socrates 
never mentions contemporary politics in his speech, the turbulent events in recent history 
could not have escaped the notice of the jury. After all, Socrates was brought to trial in 
399, shortly after the political mayhem following the Peloponesian War.  Anytus, the 
principal accuser of Socrates, was a member of the democratic party who openly opposed 
The Thirty during their rule38.  After the recent political and military disasters which 
befell Athens, it is conceivable that some of the jury blamed Socrates for producing such 
characters as Critias, Charmides, and Alcibiades.  Again, Socrates may or may not have 
openly spoken against the democracy; we have no positive evidence either way.  It is 
clear that Socrates openly criticized leaders of the democratic government (since he 
criticized nearly everyone), and that he had close personal connections to some of The 
Thirty.  For some Athenians, it may have been admissible to eliminate Socrates for these 
crimes, even if it was necessary to do so on trumped up charges. 
 Any one or several of these factors may have contributed to the jury’s ultimate 
decision to convict Socrates.  Whether or not he knew the real cause for his trial, Socrates 
seems more concerned with defending his philosophy than saving his life.  As he states in 
the Apology, he could have easily secured an acquittal if he were willing to flatter the jury 
or if he abjured his philosophy39.  In the Crito, he refuses to escape execution because it 
would be unjust to disobey the laws40 .  Many of the jury did not wish to execute him41, 
and it is possible that the majority would have preferred to exile him, had he proposed 
such a coutner-penalty.   But Socrates redefined the purpose of the trial, using it as a 
means to defend his philosophy.  He tells the jury that an acquittal would essentially 
sanction his philosophy, and, since he refused exile, a conviction and execution would 
make him into a martyr. 
 Typically, defendants are expected to be humble, or at least tactful towards the 
people deciding their fate.  But Socrates totally perverts the traditional defendants’ script, 
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hubristically demanding free meals at the Prytaneum and claiming to be the wisest person 
in Greece42.  Regardless of the validity of Socrates’ self-praise, the trial wasn’t an 
appropriate time to bring up such topics, since doing so would alienate and enrage the 
jury.  Socrates would have known that a jury on the verge of exiling or executing him 
would not change their mind suddenly and grant him state honors.    Equally incredible is 
his denial of rehearsing his speech beforehand43.  Again and again, Socrates seems not to 
take the trial seriously.  Of course, these postures of flippancy and arrogance are easily 
identified as the philosopher’s trademark rhetorical device, Socratic irony.   
 Different scholars have treated Socratic irony in various ways.  I follow Vlastos’ 
definition of Socratic irony as a specialized rhetorical figure.  According to Vlastos’ 
system, irony can be divided into two separate species, the simple and the complex.  A 
sentence with simple irony states the opposite of its intended message.  For example, in 
the Symposium, Alcibiades recalls how Socrates once mocked him, using simple irony: 
 
kai\ ou[toj a0kou/saj ma/la ei0rwnikw=j kai\ sfo/dra e9autou= te kai\ ei0wqo/twj e1lexen  
]W fi/le 0Alkibia/dh, kinduneu/eij tw|= o1nti ou0 fau=loj ei]nai ei1per a0lhqh= tugxa/nei 
o1nta a4 le/geij peri\ e0mou=, kai/ tij e1st0 e0n e0moi\ du/namij, di0 h3j a2n su\ ge/noio a0mei/nwn: 
a0mhxano/n toi ka/lloj  o9rw/|hj a2n e0n e0moi\ kai\ th=j para\ soi\ eu0morfi/aj pa/mpolu 
disfe/ron.  ei0 dh kaqorw=n au0to koinw/saqai/ te/ moi epixeirei=j kai\ a0lla/casqai 
ka/lloj a0nti\ ka/lloj, ou0k o0li/gw| mou pleonektei=n dianoh|= a0ll0 a0nti\ do/xhj a0lh/qeian 
kalw=n kta=sqai e0pixeirei=j kai\ tw=| o1nti xru/sea xalkei/wn diamei/besqai noei=j. 
(Sym. 218d-219a) 
[When (Socrates) heard this (i.e. Alcibiades’ erotic overtures), he spoke in the ironic 
manner in which he was accustomed, “My dear Alcibiades, you may not be stupid if what 
you say about me is true, and I can improve you.  You must see an extraordinary beauty 
in me, something very different from your comeliness.  If, having seen this, you are 
trying to exchange beauty for beauty, you are indeed exploiting me, but you are trying to 
obtain true beauty in exchange for supposed beauty: indeed, you aim to trade brass for 
gold.”]
As Vlastos discusses, this is an example of simple irony, because Socrates says the 
opposite of what he means.  In truth, Alcibiades is a fool, and he readily recognizes 
Socrates’ comment for what it is— an insult.  Another example of simple irony is 
Strepsiades ironic comment about his “good son” (o9 xrhsto\j ou9tosi\ neani/aj, Clouds,
8)44 .  Pheidippides is not a good son at all, but a disrespectful wastrel.  Even an 
unschooled rube like Strepsiades understands and employs simple irony.  In turn, the 
derivatives of ei0rwnei/a in modern languages always signify simple irony, except when 
stated otherwise.  Socratic irony is one such exception: though akin to simple irony, it 
carries a very different signification. 
 Vlastos defines Socratic irony as complex irony, the statement of a falsehood 
without intended deception, but the meaning of which is unclear45.  To over-simplify, 
Socratic irony is an elusive response to a question or situation. An example of complex 
irony is the conclusion of Socrates’ above conversation with Alcibiades: 
 
a0ll0, w] maka/rie, a1meinon sko/pei, mh/ se lanqa/nw ou0de\n w1n.  h3 toi th=j dianoi/aj 
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o1yij a1rxetai o0cu\ ble/pein o3tan h9 tw=n o0mma/twn th=j a0kmh=j lh/gein e0pixeirh=|: su\ de\ 
tou/twn e1ti po/rrw. (Sym. 219a) 
[Be more wise, and see that I’m nothing.  The mind’s eye begins to see well when 
eyesight begins to fail.  But you are still far from this point.] 
Here Socrates tells the obvious lie that he knows nothing.  Alcibiades knows this is false; 
he has been wooing Socrates at length in the hope of becoming his eromenos and getting 
a share of his knowledge.  Socrates uses his irony strategically46.  In the present instance, 
his evasive response allows him to avoid Alcibiades’ advances.  But Socrates’ use of 
complex irony always transcends the particular instance in which it is used, since it is an 
integral part of Socrates’ worldview.
 Without irony, Socrates’ philosophy would not exist.  As discussed above, in spite 
of Socrates’ traditional designation as a philosopher, he never really compiled a full 
philosophical system.  It is closer to the truth to say that Socrates discoursed about 
philosophical subjects and that his method of eliciting responses depended heavily on 
irony.  Socratic philosophy consisted of the elenchus and a collection of moral aphorisms 
which themselves show a close affinity to the irony of the elenchus.  For example, the 
central Socratic dictum, “I only know that I know nothing,” cannot be taken literally.
Ostensibly, this statement is a straightforward denial of erudition.  Socrates was not a 
sophist like Gorgias or Protagoras, who styled themselves as supreme polymaths.  But the 
assertion is literally contradictory: if Socrates truly did lack all a priori knowledge, he 
wouldn’t know that he did; or, except for this single axiomatic assertion— that he is 
ignorant— he denies all other a priori knowledge.  But these interpretations treat the 
Socratic dictum as if it existed in a vacuum.  It is clear that Socrates did have a priori 
knowledge since he knew how to reason and he espoused certain moral viewpoints, such 
as, “an unexamined life is not worth living,” and, “no one willingly commits injustice.”  
But both of these sayings seem to follow logically from the agnosticism of the elenchus.  
The exhortation to examine life seems like a subjective justification of the elenchus.  The 
denial of voluntary injustice is a corollary to the denial of all knowledge: if no one knows 
anything for sure, they certainly can’t know what justice is.  For readers of Plato, it is 
difficult to recognize just how sparse Socrates’ own teachings were.  Essentially, he used 
irony to elicit questions which threw into the open internal inconsistencies of his 
interlocutors’ arguments. 
 Socrates defense speech, as would be expected, is replete with his characteristic 
irony.  As mentioned above, many of his arguments in the Apology are consciously out of 
place or deliberately shocking.  Instead of explaining his associations with The Thirty, 
Socrates fobs off the jury with a ridiculous claim that Aristophanes’ Clouds was the 
ultimate source of rancor against him.  With so many cogent and believable causes for the 
trial to mention, Socrates underscores one of the least likely possibilities, that Clouds was 
in some way libelous.  It is best to interpret this claim as an instance of Socratic irony.  It 
cannot possibly be true, and it is not immediately clear what he intends by it, but it is 
clear that he is obfuscating. 
 Critics have provided a number of possible explanations for the invocation of 
Clouds which seem to suggest an ironic reading if not stating so explicitly.  Sommerstein 
suggests that Socrates aimed to belittle his accusers by implying that their indictment was 
even less of a threat than that of Clouds.  No one would take a comedy without 
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qualifications, and, Socrates suggests, by the same token, none of the jury should take the 
present charges seriously47 .  Rosen argues, along similar lines, that Socrates reproves 
his accusers for misinterpreting Clouds as though it were a true historical record of his 
career48.  Stone’s argument mentioned above— that Socrates wanted the jury to rule 
against free speech— similarly depends upon obfuscation on Socrates’ part.   The real 
question seems not to be whether Socrates was being ironical or equivocal, but precisely 
what motives he had for doing so.   
 We must rely on the historical record to supplement Socrates’ omissions.  It is 
abundantly clear that the recent political upheaval had something to do with the trial.  The 
Peloponesian war had just ended, and Athens was eager to revenge themselves on any 
scapegoat possible.  If Clouds had really persuaded anyone that Socrates ought to die, it 
seems unlikely that they would have tolerated a 24 year stay of execution.  In the 
Apology, Socrates systematically refutes the trumped up charges against him, but he does 
not escape conviction.  The prosecution was obfuscating, and through his irony Socrates 
answered them in kind.  And in the end, he succeeded in becoming a martyr for his 
philosophy.
      Conclusion 
 The assertion I made in the introduction about the perpetual difficulty of Socrates’ 
philosophy should by now be made manifest.  Socrates says Clouds was slander; we are 
tempted to believe him, and it is only through lengthy persuasion that we can be 
disabused of the philosopher’s treachery.  I firmly believe that the Apology’s first 
audience never took his words as truth.  They were probably shocked by them. 
 But Socrates’ rhetoric was hardly an empty show of oratorical power.  According to 
Vlastos’ definition, we cannot discern precisely what Socrates meant when resorting to 
irony; but in this case, he conveyed his message perfectly clearly, by means of the 
context.  By pretending to overlook the political landscape, and by making no mention of 
it whatsoever, Socrates asserts his refusal to engage in petty political strife.  His concern 
is philosophy, and his speech discusses philosophy only.  Although Socratic irony can be 
defined by a certain number of characteristic qualities, its potential uses are numerous.  
When Socrates said, “I only know that I know nothing,” he was discussing ontology and 
the limits of his dialectic method.  When he asserted, ironically, that Clouds was slander, 
he was making a point about falsity of his accusers’ arguments.   
 In my discussion of the Apology, I have largely omitted the so-called Socratic 
question, the possible disparity between the historical Socrates and Plato’s portrayal of 
him.  Some of the details in Plato’s Apology, if not the greater part of the work, may have 
been dreamed up by Plato independently of what actually occurred at the trial.
Xenophon’s Apology makes no mention of the Clouds whatsoever.  Although taxonomies 
of Plato’s works traditionally place the Apology in his early, formative period, it is just as 
possible that he wrote it last.  The Apology may be more the work of a creative 
philosopher than a disciple’s record of his teacher’s words.  There is no simple way to 
address this quandary, but fortunately it does not directly interfere with out understanding 
of the Apology as a text.  Whether the speech was first heard by a jury of 501 Athenians, 
or read by Plato’s select circle of intellectuals, the words of this particular Socrates still 
resonated with the same cultural and historical significance.  The Apology is a 
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recontexted version of the trial of Socrates, and can be understood separately from the 
more obscure historical event. 
 In summation, some of the more puzzling features of Socrates’ philosophy 
disappear once viewed from the framework of a larger philosophical system.  I have not 
presented any readings of the Apology which conflict with previous interpretations, but I 
have only illuminated a specific instance of Socratic irony in light of larger theories .  By 
doing so, I hope not only to contribute to the scholarship on a specific passage of Plato’s 
writings, but to set a possible example for further investigations of other cruxes in his 
works.  Socrates’ philosophy does not so much present a system of thought as it invites 
the audience to formulate one themselves.  It is very much in the spirit of Socrates to 
interpret his words with the aid of later philosophers.   
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